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Abstract
The economic model of the Internet of Things (IoT) consists of end users, advertisers and three different kinds of providers–
IoT service provider (IoTSP), Wireless service provider (WSP) and cloud service provider (CSP). We investigate three different
kinds of interactions among the providers. First, we consider that the IoTSP prices a bundled service to the end-users, and the
WSP and CSP pay the IoTSP (push model). Next, we consider the model where the end-users independently pay the each provider
(pull model). Finally, we consider a hybrid model of the above two where the IoTSP and WSP quote their prices to the end-users,
but the CSP quotes its price to the IoTSP.
We model different kinds of interaction among the providers as a combination of sequential and parallel non-cooperative
games. We characterize and quantify the impact of the advertisement revenue on the equilibrium pricing strategy and payoff
of providers, and corresponding demands of end users in each of the above interaction models. Our analysis reveals that the
demand of end-users, and the payoffs of the providers are non decreasing functions of the advertisement revenue. For sufficiently
high advertisement revenue, the IoTSP will offer its service free of cost in each interaction model. However, the payoffs of the
providers, and the demand of end-users vary across different interaction models. Our analysis shows that the demand of end-users,
and the payoff of the WSP are the highest in the pull (push, resp.) model in the low (high, resp.) advertisement revenue regime.
The payoff of the IoTSP is always higher in the pull model irrespective of the advertisement revenue. The payoff of the CSP
is the highest in the hybrid model in the low advertisement revenue regime. However, in the high advertisement revenue regime
the payoff of the CSP in the hybrid model or in the push model can be higher depending on the equilibrium chosen in the push
model.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a world-wide network where various kinds of objects such as sensors, RFID tags, robots and
smart phones will interact and operate with minimal human intervention. The IoT has several applications– such as in smart
grid, e-Health service, smart transportation system, building, and home automation. Research has been initiated to combat the
technical challenges associated with the IoT [2], [3], however, the economic aspects of the IoT remain largely ignored. Large
scale proliferation of the IoT will critically depend on rendering it profitable to all the entities in the IoT paradigm. We seek
to contribute in this space.
B. Different Entities and modes of interactions
We first characterize the entities involved in an IoT architecture: end-users (e.g. individuals, organizations, government
agencies), advertisers, and providers. There are three different kinds of providers in an IoT– the IoT Service Provider (IoTSP),
the Wireless Service Provider (WSP), and the Cloud Service Provider (CSP). An IoT service will be provided by the IoTSP
(e.g. Apple 1, General Electric) similar to Internet service provided by the Internet service provider (ISP). The CSP (e.g.
Amazon EC2) will help to store and process the enormous amount of data generated in the IoT. The WSP (e.g. At&T) will
enable the communication amongst devices, and between the devices and the providers2. Online advertisement will generate
revenue for the IoTSP as well as additional traffic for the WSP and CSP, and additional reimbursement for them3.
The IoT market is still not widely deployed4. When it will be widely deployed, the interaction among the entities is expected
to be similar to the legacy technologies such as the internet and app markets. Towards this end, we investigate three different
interaction models which are analogous to the existing models in legacy technologies. In the push or centralized model, the
IoTSP procures the bandwidth and computing resources from the WSP and the CSP respectively and “pushes” the bundled
service at a price pI to end-users (Fig. 1). The term “push” is drawn from the literature on the pricing in the Internet and
Telecommunications where the “push” corresponds to the setting when a service provider pushes the data to the end-user [11],
[12]. An example of the interaction model analogous to the push model is the Kindle service by Amazon. Amazon (analogous
to the IoTSP) charges only the end-users while delivering the e-books to the Kindle devices using the wireless service of
Whispernet (analogous to the WSP); Whispernet only gets its revenue from the Amazon.
A part of this paper was presented in ISIT’15 [1].
The authors are with the Electrical and Systems Engg. Department of University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA. Their e-mail ids are–
arnob@seas.upenn.edu and swati@seas.upenn.edu.
1Apple is going to launch a smart home-kit platform for smart home appliances very soon.
2Since there will be a large number of devices in the IoT, thus, the communication will be mainly through wireless media. Thus, we consider a WSP, but
our analysis will go through for wired service providers.
3In the IoT, customized advertisement will be popular depending on the IoT service. For example, for smart vehicle system advertisement of auto-insurance
can be seen.
4AT&T is offering smart home security system where it offers a bundled service to the end-users. However, the market is still in very early stage.
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2Fig. 1. Different interaction models: Push framework is depicted in the left hand side figure, pull and a hybrid frameworks are depicted in the center and
the right hand side respectively. In each interaction model, advertisers pay the IoTSP. Directed arrows denote the direction in which money flows.
On the other extreme in a decentralized setting or pull model, each provider separately quotes a price to end-users, and
an end-user “pulls” the service from the providers by paying them separately (Fig. 1). Similar to the push, the name “pull”
is again drawn from the literature on the pricing in the Internet and Telecommunication where the “pull” corresponds to the
setting when an end-user “pulls” the data from the service provider [11], [12]. Interaction models similar to the pull model are
also seen in practice. For example, both the ISP (analogous to the WSP) and some content providers (e.g. Netflix, analogous
to the IoTSP) charge the end-users for the content.
We also consider a hybrid of the above two models, where the IoTSP and WSP separately quote their prices to the end-users,
but the CSP quotes its price to the IoTSP only (Fig. 1). The analogous interaction model is also prevalent in the app market. For
example, in the current app markets (e.g. Google play store) end-users pay the WSP and the application providers (analogous
to the IoTSP) for their services. End-users do not pay the CSP. The application providers pay the CSP (e.g. Google cloud
service).
C. Technical Challenges and Objectives
We now discuss the technical challenges involved in analyzing different interaction models. Towards this end, we first discuss
the similarities and dissimilarities among different models. In all these models, the demand of end-users decreases (increase,
respectively) with the increase (decreases, resp.) in price that an end-user has to pay. In the pull model, the prices charged
by all providers directly influence the demand. In the push (hybrid, resp.) model, the price charged by the IoTSP (IoTSP and
WSP, resp.) directly influences the demand. On the other hand the price charged by the WSP, and the CSP (the CSP, resp.)
indirectly influence the demand in the push (hybrid, resp.) model. The indirect influence in the push (hybrid, resp.) model is
the following– if the WSP and the CSP (the CSP, resp.) increase their prices charged to the IoTSP, then the IoTSP also has to
increase its price quoted to end-users which in turn will decrease the demand. Thus, the providers’ payoffs are not maximized
at the extreme points. We characterize pricing strategies of providers in different interaction models.
We now discuss the impact of the advertisement revenue on each provider and the demand of end-users. Advertisement
revenue directly benefits the IoTSP and indirectly benefits the WSP and the CSP. The indirect influence is the following– in
the push (pull or hybrid, resp.) model the IoTSP (end-user, resp.) has to pay the WSP for the additional traffic which increases
the WSP’s payoffs. Additional computing resources are also required for advertisement, thus, end-users (IoTSP, resp.) have
to pay the CSP in the pull model (push or hybrid, resp.) which increases the CSP’s payoff. The advertisement revenue might
benefit the end-users. This is because advertisement revenue may enable the IoTSP to decrease its price leading to an increase
in demand. However, the IoTSP (end-users, resp.) also has to pay the WSP more for the additional advertisement traffic in the
push (pull or hybrid, resp.) model which decreases the payoff of the IoTSP (the demand of end-users, resp.). Thus, the impact
of the advertisement revenue on the demand of the end-users and the payoffs of the providers is also not apriori clear.
With our analysis we seek to characterize the answers of the following fundamental questions:
• How do the IoTSP, WSP and CSP select their prices to the end-users or amongst each other depending on the interaction
model? How does the IoTSP quote its price to the advertisers?
• How will the advertisement revenue impact the demand of the end-users (or, the reach of IoT service) and the pricing
strategies of the providers in different interaction models? How does the advertisement revenue will impact the payoffs
of the providers?
The answers of the above questions will provide us an insight on the followings–
• Among different interaction models, in which model the demand of end-users (or, the reach of the IoT service) will be
the highest?
3• Which model will provide the highest payoff to each provider and advertisers?
The above questions are of substantial significance. When the IoT-market will be widely deployed, it is expected to be one
of the two types– i) a free market where each of the above interaction models can co-exist, ii) a regulated market where the
interaction model can be chosen by a policy maker. If the market is free, a provider (either the IoTSP, WSP or CSP) may want
to adopt the interaction model which will fetch him the highest payoff. Thus, the provider may want to know which interaction
model will fetch him the highest payoff. On the other hand, if the market is regulated, then the policy maker wants to adopt
an interaction model which satisfies its objective. For example, if the goal is to enhance the reach of the IoT technology, the
policy maker would prefer to adopt the interaction model where the demand will be the highest. On the other hand, if the
policy maker wants to incentivize a provider (either IoTSP, WSP or the CSP), then it will adopt the interaction model that will
be preferable to the provider. Thus, the policy maker needs to quantify the payoffs of the entities in each interaction model.
D. Our Contributions
1) Problem Formulation: We develop an economic framework that models three different interaction models described
above. We consider a monopolistic setting i.e. there is one IoTSP, one WSP and one CSP. We consider a non-cooperative game
between the advertisers and the IoTSP where advertisers decide to participate in the advertisement depending on the price set
by the IoTSP and the end-users’ preference (Section VI). Then, the IoTSP, the WSP and the CSP select their prices in different
interaction models (push, pull and hybrid). We formulate a non-cooperative game theoretic setting where the IoTSP, WSP and
CSP select their respective prices in order to maximize the individual payoff in each of the three interaction models.
We model the price selection problem in the push interaction as a combination of a sequential and parallel non cooperative
game. In the first stage of the sequential game, the WSP and the CSP quote their prices in parallel, in the second stage, the
IoTSP selects its price with the knowledge of the prices quoted by the WSP and the CSP (Section III-A). We characterize
the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in the above game. In the pull model, since an end-user independently pays
the providers, we consider a non-cooperative game where providers select prices for end-users in parallel (Section IV-A).
We characterize the Nash equilibrium in the above game. In the hybrid model, since the IoTSP pays the CSP and end-users
independently pay the WSP and the IoTSP, we consider a combination of sequential and parallel games, where in the first
stage of the game the CSP quotes its price to the IoTSP and then in the last stage, the IoTSP and the WSP select prices in
parallel (Section V). We characterize the SPNE in the above.
The characterization of the equilibrium pricing strategies will provide us an insight on the questions posed above. The natural
question is whether there exists a unique or multiple equilibria pricing strategies. If there exist multiple equlibria we seek to
characterize whether the answers of the above questions change in different equilibrium strategies.
2) Results: We fully characterize the equilibrium (may be multiple) pricing strategies in the push, pull and hybrid model.
Our analysis reveals that in the push model–
• There is a unique SPNE when the advertisement revenue per user is below a certain threshold (say, T ), but there are
infinitely many SPNEs when it exceeds T (Theorem 1) .
• The price charged by the IoTSP (payoff of the IoTSP, respectively) decreases (increases,resp.) as the advertisement revenue
per user increases when it is below T (Theorem 2, Corollary 1, resp.). At and above T , the IoTSP can sustain a service
free of cost (Theorem 2). The IoTSP’s payoff becomes constant when the advertisement revenue per user exceeds T
(Corollary 2); thus, the IoTSP only retains a fixed share of the advertisement revenue and the rest is shared between the
WSP and CSP in this regime.
• The price (payoff, resp.) of the WSP (or CSP) increases with the advertisement revenue per user when it is below T
(Theorem 1, Corollary 1, respv. ). At and above T , the price (payoff, respv.) will depend on the selection of equilibrium
since there are multiple SPNEs, but the sum of the payoffs of the WSP and CSP is always unique and increases linearly
with the advertisement revenue (Corollary 2).
• Since the demand increases monotonically with the decrease in price quoted by the IoTSP, the demand increases when the
advertisement revenue per user is below T (Corollary 1). At and above T , the demand remains constant at the maximum
value (Corollary 2).
Our analysis shows that in the pull model
• Unlike the push model, there is a unique NE in the pull model for all sets of parameters (Theorem 3).
• The payoff of the IoTSP increases monotonically with advertisement revenue per user for all sets of parameters (Corollaries
3 and 4). Payoffs of the WSP and CSP increase with advertisement revenues per user when it is below a certain threshold
(T1) (Corollary 3) and remain constant when it exceeds T1 (Corollary 4). Thus, unlike the push model, the IoTSP grabs
all the advertisement revenue when it becomes very high.
• Total payment that an end-user has to make decreases (remains constant, resp.) when the advertisement revenue per user
is below T1 (at and above T1, resp.) (Theorem 3).
• The behavior of the demand is similar to the push model (Corollaries 3&4). Only difference is that when the advertisement
revenue per user exceeds T1 then it remains constant at a value lower than the maximum value (Corollary 4).
Our analysis reveals that in the hybrid interaction model
4• There exists a unique SPNE pricing strategy for providers in the hybrid model for all sets of parameters (Theorem 5).
• Payoffs of all providers increase as the advertisement revenue per user increases when it is below a certain threshold
(T2) (Corollary 5); payoffs of the IoTSP and WSP become constant when it exceeds T2 (Corollary 6). Thus, the IoTSP
only retains a fixed share from the advertisement revenue and the rest is captured by the CSP in the high advertisement
revenue per user regime.
• Total payment that an end-user has to make decreases (remains constant, resp.) when the advertisement revenue per user
is below T2 (at and above T2, resp.) (Theorem 5).
• The behavior of demand is similar to the push and pull model (Corollaries 5 & 6). Only difference is that when the
advertisement revenue per user exceeds T2 then it remains constant at a value lower than the maximum value, but it is
greater than that of the pull model (Corollary 4).
We show that the IoTSP selects a price which maximizes the advertisement revenue that the IoTSP will get for each end-user
in all the models (Section VI).
We compare the payoffs and the demand associated with these models (Section VII)–
• Demand and thus, the reach of the IoT technology, is the highest in the pull (push, resp.) model for low (high, resp.)
advertisement revenue per user regime (Corollary 7). Demand in the hybrid model is the same (lower, resp.) as in the
push model in the low (higher, resp.) advertisement revenue per user regime.
• The IoTSP’s payoff is the highest in the pull model (Corollary 8) for all sets of parameters. IoTSP’s payoff in the hybrid
model is the same (lower, resp.) as in the push model in the low (high, resp.) advertisement revenue per user regime.
• The payoff of the WSP is the highest (lowest, resp.) in the pull model for low (high, resp.) advertisement revenue per
user regime (Corollary 9). The WSP’s payoff in the push model is always higher compared to the hybrid model. Thus,
the WSP’s payoff is the highest in the push model in the high advertisement revenue per user regime.
• The payoff of the CSP is the highest in the hybrid model in the low advertisement revenue regime (Corollary 10).
The payoff of the CSP is higher (lower, resp.) in the push model compared to the pull model in the high (low, resp.)
advertisement revenue regime. In the high advertisement revenue per user regime, the CSP’s payoff is not unique in the
push model because the SPNE is not unique. We show that the CSP’s payoff is higher (lower, resp.) in the hybrid model
compared to the worst (best, resp.) possible payoff that the CSP attains in the push model (Corollary 10).
• Each participating advertiser will prefer the model which incurs the highest demand (Section VII-E).
E. Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge this is the first investigation of the economic aspect of interactions among providers of different
kinds in an IoT setting. However, the pricing strategies in a system consisting of only one kind of provider has been extensively
studied e.g. ISP [4], WSP [5], [16] or CSP [7], [8]. But different modes of interactions like push, pull and hybrid naturally
arise when there are multiple kinds of providers as in the IoT. Payoff functions of different kinds of providers are also different;
for example advertisers directly pay only the IoTSP, while the WSP and CSP only get indirect shares of the advertisement
revenue either from end-users or the IoTSP.
Some recent work on the net-neutrality considered the interaction between the ISP and Content provider (CP) [9], [13].
[9] considers a setting similar to the push model where the ISP only charges the CP and the CP charges the end-users. [13]
considers that the ISP and CP both charge the end-users (similar to the pull model in our setting). But the pricing game in
the IoT context requires a different problem formulation. For example [9] needs a purely sequential game where first the CP
selects its price and then the ISP selects its price; but the push model which is the closest to [9] needs a combination of a
sequential and a parallel game; in the first stage of this interaction, the WSP and CSP select their prices in parallel and then
the IoTSP selects its price. The results are also substantially different. For example, [9] shows that there always exists a unique
SPNE. But we find that there may be infinitely many SPNEs in the push model. We also characterize the interaction between
the IoTSP and advertisers and investigate the optimal price that the IoTSP should quote to the advertisers. This enables us to
characterize the demand of end-users and the payoffs of the providers in all the possible advertisement revenue regime which
have not been studied in [9] and [13]. Moreover, the hybrid interaction model can only arise when there are more than two
different kinds of providers in the system as in the IoT. Hence, the hybrid interaction model has not been studied in the above
papers. We also analytically provide a comparison of the payoffs of providers and demand in different models.
In Economics, interactions among providers of different kinds have been studied in the supply chain management where
different providers select prices for different complementary products [14], [15]. [14] studied the model where the providers
select prices simultaneously to the end-users (similar to the pull model in our setting). [15] studied a model similar to the push
model where in the first stage providers select prices simultaneously (similar to the WSP and CSP) and in the second stage
an assembler selects price (similar to the IoTSP) to the end-users for the assembled product. The main differences with the
above mentioned papers are twofold.
First, both of the above papers did not consider the impact of the advertisement revenue. The consideration of the above
leads to a different characterization of the payoff function of the IoTSP. The IoTSP’s payoff now depends on the demand of
the end-users, the price quoted by the IoTSP and the advertisement revenue for each user whereas in [14] and [15] the payoff
5of each provider only depends on the demand of the end-users and the price quoted by the provider. Since the payoff function
is different in our setting, the analysis of the pricing interaction among the providers is also different. The analysis of the game
in the high advertisement revenue regime is also significantly different and challenging compared to the low advertisement
revenue regime. For example, when the advertisement revenue per user becomes sufficiently high, then the price quoted by the
IoTSP becomes 0 in the push model, and the payoff function of the providers is no longer a strictly concave function in the
decision variables. Hence, the first order condition is no longer sufficient for the existence of the Nash Equilibrium in the high
advertisement revenue regime. Thus, the result is different in the high advertisement revenue regime compared to the lower
advertisement revenue regime. For example, we show that there are infinitely many SPNEs whereas there is a unique SPNE
in the lower advertisement revenue regime. [15] also concluded that the the push interaction is not socially optimal since the
price quoted to the end-users never becomes 0. However, our analysis shows that in the high advertisement revenue regime,
the payment that each end-user incurs becomes 0.
Second, [14] and [15] did not consider the hybrid interaction model among the providers which we consider. In the hybrid
model, we need to introduce a different economic framework compared to the push and the pull model. In the hybrid interaction
model, in the first stage the CSP selects its price to the IoTSP and then the IoTSP and the WSP select their prices simultaneously
to the end-users.
Additionally, [14] considered a model where the demand is always non zero and the demand becomes infinite when the
price becomes 0. In practice, the demand is always finite and the demand will be zero when the price is sufficiently high which
we model in our setting. The consideration of the above significantly altered the characterization of the pricing strategy.
Proofs have been relegated to the Appendix. Due to the space constraint we relegate some algebraic manipulations in the
proofs to our archived report [?].
II. PLAYERS, DECISION VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS
We investigate a monopoly where there is one provider of each kind i.e. there is one IoTSP, WSP and CSP.
The IoTSP decides the price b ≥ 0 for per unit of advertisement volume and in response, each advertiser decides to advertise
or not depending on the advertiser’s expected revenue that it will get from each end-user. The total advertisement volume is a1
for each end-user. The IoTSP receives ba1 amount of advertisement revenue per user. In general, a1 is a decreasing function
of b.
Advertisers decide the additional cloud resources a2 required for each end-user for providing customized advertisement. a2
is a function of a1. We discuss the interaction between IoTSP and advertisers in detail in Section VI.
The IoTSP decides a price pI ≥ 0 to end-users for an IoT application in the push, pull and hybrid model5. The price may
be a periodic subscription fee6 or may be the price per application7. The WSP decides a charge of pw ≥ 0 per data (in bytes).
Note that in the push model (the pull and hybrid models, resp.) the charge is levied on the IoTSP (end-users, resp.). We
consider a usage based pricing scheme, but our result easily generalizes to other pricing schemes. The CSP decides a charge
of pc ≥ 0 for each unit of resource. Note that in the push and hybrid models (pull model, resp.) the charge is levied on the
IoTSP (end-users, resp.). Similar type of pricing is currently employed by Amazon EC2 [18].
We denote– i) the average data flow (in bytes per second) required for each end-user for IoT application as α; ii) cloud
capacities required to serve one end-user as β. Note that α+a1 (β+a2, resp.) is the total data traffic (cloud capacity required,
resp.) for each end-user.
We consider that in the first stage of each interaction model the IoTSP selects b and in response, a1 is selected (Fig. 1,
Section VI). Since a2 is a function of a1, a2 is readily obtained once a1 is known. After knowing b, a1 and a2 the IoTSP,
WSP and CSP select pI , pw, pc respectively in different interaction models (push, pull and hybrid). In the push model, the CSP
and the WSP select their prices pw, pc to the IoTSP simultaneously and then, the IoTSP selects its price pI to the end-users
(Fig. 1). In the pull model, the IoTSP, the WSP and CSP select prices pI , pw, pc simultaneously to the end-users (Fig. 1).
In the hybrid model, the CSP selects its price pc to the IoTSP and then the IoTSP and the WSP selects prices pI and pw
respectively to the end-users (Fig. 1).
We characterize the equilibrium prices, the payoffs of the providers and the demand of the end-users by considering b and
a1 as parameters in the push (Section III), the pull (Section IV) and the hybrid (Section V) model. Subsequently, we analyze
how IoTSP should select b in order to maximize its own payoff in Section VI in each of the interaction models.
III. PUSH MODEL
A. System Model
In the push model, the price of the IoTSP directly impacts the demand of end-users. The prices of the WSP and CSP directly
impact the prices of the IoTSP. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that whenever the WSP and CSP vary their prices, the IoTSP
will also change its own price. Thus, we consider a non cooperative game where in the first stage the WSP and CSP decide
5There may be an additional fixed installation cost which we do not consider.
6AT&T has already announced monthly subscription scheme for its smart home secure appliances [17].
7One such example is that Amazon charges a price only when a book is downloaded via Kindle. End-users do not need to pay a periodic subscription fee.
6their prices pw, pc they will charge the IoTSP (sub-game 1) and in the last stage the IoTSP selects the price pI to the end-users
with the knowledge of prices of the WSP and the CSP (sub-game 2) (Fig. 1). The overall game is a variant of Stackelberg
game8where the CSP and WSP are the leaders and the IoTSP is the follower.
The demand of end-users only depends on the price of IoTSP i.e. pI . We assume that the demand-response of end-users
follows a linear relationship–
Dpush = max{Dmax − dpI , 0} (1)
where d denotes the price sensitivity9 of end-users, Dmax is the maximum demand. A linear demand response function is
prevalent in practice and has been extensively studied in Economics [10], and internet [13]. The consideration of the non-linear
demand response function is a work for the future.
The IoTSP receives Dpushba1 amount from the advertisement, but, it also has to pay pw(α+ a1)Dpush amount to the WSP
and pc(β + a2)Dpush amount to the CSP. Thus, the IoTSP’s payoff is
UI,push = pIDpush + bDpusha1 − pwDpush(α+ a1)
−pcDpush(β + a2) (2)
WSP’s payoff = Uw,push = pwDpush(α+ a1) (3)
CSP’s payoff = Uc,push = pcDpush(β + a2) (4)
We seek to characterize the Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the above game.
Definition 1. [19] A Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) strategy profile is an NE [19] at every subgame.
In Section III-B we characterize the equilibrium prices pw, pI , pc and the payoffs of providers in terms of b, a1 and a2,
subsequently in Section VI we will show how the IoTSP should select b.
B. Results
We summarize the main results of this section–
• The NE pricing strategies of the WSP and CSP (i.e. at sub-game 1) are unique when the advertisement revenue per user,
ba1 ≤ 5Dmax/d , however there are infinitely many NE pricing strategies when dba1 > 5Dmax (Theorem 1). The NE
pricing strategy of the IoTSP in the sub-game 2 is always unique (Theorem 2). When dba1 > 5Dmax, though there are
infinitely many SPNEs, the IoTSP’s payoff as well as the sum of the payoffs of the WSP and CSP are always unique
(Corollary 2).
• The price of the IoTSP quoted to the end-users decreases as ba1 increases and becomes 0 when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax10. Thus,
even though the IoTSP has to share its revenue with the CSP and WSP, it can still offer its service at free. Intuitively,
the total advertisement revenue procured by the IoTSP is ba1Dpush; thus, when ba1 is high, then the IoTSP can procure
high advertisement revenue by selecting a lower price which in turn increases Dpush, and the revenue.
The prices of the WSP and CSP quoted to the IoTSP increase with ba1 when dba1 ≤ 5Dmax. Though there are infinitely
many equilibria when dba1 > 5Dmax, the sum of payment received by WSP and CSP for each end-user is unique and
increases linearly with ba1.
• Since the price quoted by the IoTSP decreases (Theorem 2) with ba1 when dba1 ≤ 5Dmax, the demand increases in this
regime (Corollary 1). The demand becomes equal to the maximum possible value since the price charged by the IoTSP
to the end-users becomes 0 when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax(Corollary 2).
• The payoffs of the providers depend on the demand and the prices. We now summarize the payoffs at the equilibrium.
We show that the payoffs of the providers increase with ba1 (Fig.2) when ba1 ≤ 5Dmax (Corollary 1). Thus, if the IoTSP
can procure high ba1, then, it not only increases the payoff of the IoTSP, but it also increases the payoffs of the WSP and
CSP though the advertisers only pay the IoTSP. The WSP and CSP attain twice the payoff of the IoTSP (Corollary 1).
Intuitively, the prices of the WSP and CSP do not directly affect the demand of end-users, thus, they can gain more by
selecting higher prices even though the IoTSP has direct source of revenue from advertisers.
The payoff of the IoTSP is independent of ba1 in this regime (from (12), Fig.2). Thus, the IoTSP retains only a constant
amount of revenue from the advertisement. The rest of the advertisement revenue is shared between the CSP and the WSP
( by 13)). Thus, the WSP and the CSP receive higher shares of the advertisement revenue even though the advertisers
only pay the IoTSP.
We now describe the results in detail.
8In a Stackelrberg kind of game [19], the leader first selects its action, and then the follower selects its action with the complete knowledge of the action
chosen by the leader. In the push interaction, however, there are multiple followers, hence it is different than traditional Stackelberg game.
9High price sensitivity indicates that demand will decrease (increase, resp.) at a high rate with an increase (decrease, resp.) in the price.
10Note that similar pricing strategy is also prevalent in some legacy technologies. For example, in the app market, some application providers sell their
apps at a free of cost, but it also comes with a lot of advertisement; on the other hand, some application providers charge the end-users for their products,
but these apps do not provide a lot of advertisement.
71) Equilibrium Price: NE Pricing p∗I at sub-game 2:
Lemma 1. The unique NE pricing strategy p∗I in sub-game 2 is
p∗I = max
{
Dmax
2d
− ba1
2
+
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
, 0
}
. (5)
NE Pricing strategy (p∗w, p∗c) at sub-game 1:
Theorem 1. When dba1 < 5Dmax, then the unique NE (p∗w, p∗c) in the sub-game is
p∗w =
Dmax
3d(α+ a1)
+
ba1
3(α+ a1)
(6)
p∗c =
Dmax
3d(β + a2)
+
ba1
3(β + a2)
(7)
When dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, then any (p∗w, p∗c) which satisfies the following conditions constitutes an NE in this sub-game
p∗w(α+ a1) ∈ [2Dmax/d, ba1 − 3Dmax/d] (8)
p∗c(β + a2) ∈ [2Dmax/d, ba1 − 3Dmax/d] (9)
such that pc(β + a2) + pw(α+ a1) = ba1 −Dmax/d (10)
Note that ba1 − 3Dmax/d ≥ 2Dmax/d when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax. Thus, the interval from which the WSP and CSP select their
prices given in (8) and (9) respectively is non-empty.
Replacing the values of (p∗w, p
∗
c) in (5):
Theorem 2. At SPNE,
p∗I = max
{
5Dmax
6d
− ba1
6
, 0
}
(11)
The above theorem entails that though (p∗w, p
∗
c) are not always unique, p
∗
I is always unique.
2) Payoffs of providers and Demand of end-users: -
a) dba1 < 5Dmax:
Corollary 1. When dba1 < 5Dmax, then at equilibrium
Dpush =
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
UI,push = d
(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2
Uw,push = Uc,push = 2d
(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2
b) dba1 ≥ 5Dmax: Now we evaluate the demand and payoffs at equilibrium when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax. Since the SPNE is not
unique in this case we also characterize the worst possible payoffs for the WSP (Uw,worst,push) and the CSP (Uc,worst,push)
and the best possible payoffs for the WSP (Uw,best,push) and the CSP (Uc,best,push).
Corollary 2. When dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, then
Dpush = Dmax
UI,push = D
2
max/d, at each SPNE (12)
Uw,worst,push = Uc,worst,push =
2D2max
d
Uc,best,push = Uw,best,push = (ba1 − 3Dmax/d)Dmax
Uw,push + Uc,push = ba1Dmax −D2max/d (13)
Fig. 2 shows the variation of the IoTSP and the sum of the payoffs of the WSP and CSP with ba1 in an example setting.
8Fig. 2. We consider: d = 1, Dmax = 15.
UI,push becomes static when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax =
75, but Uc,push + Uw,push linearly increases
when ba1 ≥ 75.
Fig. 3. We consider the same example setting as
in fig. 2. UI,pull and Uw,pull are the same for
ba1 ≤ 5, but when ba1 > 5, UI,pull > Uw,pull.
From Corollaries 3 and 4 Uw,pull = Uc,pull.
Fig. 4. We consider the same example setting
as in fig. 2. UI,hybrid remains constant when
ba1 ≥ 2Dmax/d = 30, but Uc,hybrid always
increases with ba1. From Corollaries 5 and 6 note
that UI,hybrid = Uw,hybrid.
IV. PULL MODEL
A. System Model
The IoTSP, WSP and CSP all directly charge prices to the end-users in the pull model (Fig. 1). An end-user needs to pay
pw(α+ a1) and pc(β + a2) amount to the WSP and CSP respectively. Thus, the demand is
Dpull = max{Dmax − d(pI + pw(α+ a1) + pc(β + a2)), 0} (14)
We consider the same price sensitivity parameter d for the prices of different providers11.
Since the IoTSP does not pay either the WSP or CSP, the payoff functions are
UI,pull = pI ∗Dpull + ba1 ∗Dpull (15)
WSP’s payoff = Uw,pull = pw(α+ a1)Dpull (16)
CSP’s payoff = Uc,pull = pc(β + a2)Dpull (17)
Since each provider independently quotes its price to the end-users, we consider a non cooperative game where each provider
simultaneously selects its price. We characterize the NE strategy profile in terms of b, a1 and a2.
B. Results
We, first, summarize the main attributes of the NE strategy and subsequently, we describe the results in detail.
• Unlike in the push model, the NE pricing strategy is always unique in the pull model (Theorem 3).
• Similar to the push model, the price quoted to the end-users by the IoTSP decreases with ba1 (recall that ba1 is the
advertisement revenue per user) and the prices of the WSP and CSP quoted to the end-users increase with ba1 when ba1
is below a threshold. However, the threshold is Dmax/(3d) in the pull model whereas the threshold is 5Dmax/d in the
push model. The reduction in the price by the IoTSP helps the WSP and CSP to increase their prices without affecting
the demand much. The price selected by the IoTSP becomes 0 when dba1 ≥ Dmax/3. The prices of the WSP and CSP
also become independent of ba1. Once pI becomes 0, the IoTSP can not decrease its price further, thus, the WSP and
CSP can not increase their prices as it will decrease the demand which in turn reduces the payoffs.
• The demand Dpull increases with ba1 despite that end-users pay the WSP for the additional advertisement traffic a1
(Corollary 3). Note from Theorem 3 that the increase in ba1 enables the IoTSP to decrease its price which enhances the
demand. Corollary 4 entails that the demand becomes independent of ba1 when dba1 > Dmax/3. This is because the
total payment that an end-user incurs becomes independent of ba1 when dba1 > Dmax/3 (by Theorem 3). Each end-user
has to pay the WSP and CSP under all cases unlike in the push model, thus, the demand never reaches the maximum
possible value, Dmax.
• The payoffs are the same for each provider when dba1 ≤ Dmax/3 unlike in the push model (Corollary 3, Fig.3).
Since the payment made by an end-user becomes independent of ba1, the payoffs of the WSP and CSP become independent
of ba1 when dba1 > Dmax/3. The IoTSP’s payoff increases linearly with ba1 when dba1 > Dmax/3 (Corollary 4). Unlike
in the push model, the IoTSP retains all the revenue generated from advertisement when the advertisement revenue per
user is high (Corollary 4, Fig.3). Hence in this regime, the WSP and CSP do not get any share of the advertisement
revenue unlike in the push model. Intuitively, in the push model, the WSP and CSP quote their prices to the IoTSP; thus,
the CSP and the WSP can increase their prices with the increase in ba1 without directly decreasing the demand, hence
the payoffs of the CSP and WSP always increase with ba1. However, in the pull model, the WSP and the CSP quote their
prices to the end-users, thus, once the price quoted by the IoTSP becomes 0, the WSP and CSP can not increase their
prices without decreasing the demand since the IoTSP can not decrease its price below 0.
11The generalization of our model to account for different price sensitivity parameters for different providers is straightforward.
91) Equilibrium prices (p∗I , p
∗
w, p
∗
c):
Theorem 3. The NE strategy profile is unique–
p∗I =

Dmax
4d
− 3ba1
4
if dba1 ≤ Dmax/3
0 if dba1 > Dmax/3
p∗w =

Dmax
4d(α+ a1)
+
ba1
4(α+ a1)
if dba1 ≤ Dmax/3
Dmax
3d(α+ a1)
if dba1 > Dmax/3
p∗c =

Dmax
4d(β + a2)
+
ba1
4(β + a2)
if dba1 ≤ Dmax/3
Dmax
3d(β + a2)
if dba1 > Dmax/3
Note that the NE strategy profile is always unique unlike in the push model.
2) Payoffs of providers and Demand of end-users:
a) dba1 ≤ Dmax/3:
Corollary 3. When dba1 ≤ Dmax/3, then at equilibrium
Dpull =
Dmax
4
+ d
ba1
4
UI,pull = Uw,pull = Uc,pull = d
(
Dmax
4d
+
ba1
4
)2
b) dba1 > Dmax/3:
Corollary 4. When dba1 > Dmax/3, then at equilibrium
Dpull =
Dmax
3
UI,pull = ba1
Dmax
3
(18)
Uw,pull = Uc,pull = D
2
max/(9d)
The payoffs of the IoTSP, WSP and CSP have been depicted in Fig. 3.
V. HYBRID MODEL
A. System Model
The IoTSP and WSP independently quote their prices to the end-users and the CSP only quotes its price to the IoTSP (Fig. 1)
in this model. Thus, the prices of the IoTSP and WSP directly impact the end-users and the CSP’s price directly impacts the
IoTSP. Thus, we consider a sequential non cooperative game where in the first stage (Sub-game 1) the CSP quotes its price
to the IoTSP, then in the second stage (Sub-game 2) the IoTSP and WSP select their prices in parallel with the knowledge
of the price of the CSP. The overall game is a variant of Stackelberg game where the CSP is the leader and the IoTSP, and
WSP are the followers.
The demand of the end-users is
Dhybrid = max{Dmax − d(pI + pw(α+ a1)), 0} (19)
In the hybrid model, since the IoTSP has to pay the CSP to procure resources, the IoTSP’s payoff is
UI,hybrid = Dhybrid(pI − pc(β + a2) + ba1) (20)
WSP’s payoff = Uw,hybrid = pwDhybrid(α+ a1) (21)
CSP’s payoff = Uc,hybrid = pcDhybrid(β + a2) (22)
In Section V-B we find the SPNE pricing strategy profile and payoffs of providers in terms of b, a1 and a2. In Section VI
we discuss how the IoTSP should select b.
10
B. Results
We first summarize the main attributes of the equilibrium strategy focussing on the similarities and dissimilarities comapared
to the push and pull models.
• We show that unlike in the push model (but, similar to the pull model), the SPNE pricing strategy is unique in the hybrid
model (Theorems 4 and 5).
• Similar to the push and pull models, pI quoted to the end-users decreases with the advertisement revenue per user, ba1
and pw, pc increase with ba1 when dba1 is below a threshold. However, we show that the threshold is 2Dmax which is in
between the push (5Dmax) and the pull model (Dmax/3). When dba1 ≥ 2Dmax, pI becomes 0. pw the price quoted to
the end-users by WSP becomes independent of ba1 when dba1 ≥ 2Dmax, thus, the payment that an end-user incurs also
becomes independent of ba1 when dba1 ≥ 2Dmax. However, the price quoted by the CSP to the IoTSP i.e. pc increases
linearly with ba1 even when dba1 ≥ 2Dmax.
• Similar to the push and pull models, the demand Dhybrid is strictly increasing in ba1 when ba1 is below the threshold
(2Dmax/d) (Corollary 5) and Dhybrid becomes constant when ba1 is large enough (Corollary 6).
However, there are some differences compared to the push and pull models. We show that the demand is higher (lower,
resp.) than the maximum demand achieved in the pull (push, resp.) model. Intuitively, since end-users always have to pay
the WSP, unlike in the push model the demand never reaches the maximum value; but since end-users do not have to
pay the CSP, unlike in the pull model, the demand remains constant at Dmax/2 which is higher compared to maximum
demand achieved in the pull model.
• The payoffs of the IoTSP and WSP are equal, but the CSP’s payoff is strictly higher than that of the IoTSP and WSP
(Corollary 5). The price of the CSP does not affect directly the demand of the end-users. Thus, the CSP acquires more
payoff compared to the IoTSP and WSP by selecting a higher price but without reducing the demand. Note that in contrast,
the payoffs of the IoTSP, WSP and CSP are equal in the pull model. On the other hand, the payoffs of the WSP and CSP
are equal and higher compared to the IoTSP in the push model.
The payoffs of the IoTSP and the WSP are independent of ba1 when ba1 ≥ 2Dmax/d (Corollary 6, Fig.4). The CSP
procures the rest of the revenue from advertising sources when dba1 ≥ 2Dmax (Corollary 6, Fig. 4) though the advertisers
only pay the IoTSP. Corollary 6 also shows that the CSP’s payoff is strictly higher compared to the payoffs of the IoTSP
and WSP. In the hybrid model, similar to the push model, the CSP charges the IoTSP. Thus, in the hybrid model, the
CSP can increase its price without directly decreasing the demand, hence, similar to the push model (unlike in the pull
model) the CSP procures a greater share of revenue from the advertisement. On the other hand, similar to the pull model
(and unlike in the push model), the WSP quotes its price to the end-users in the hybrid model. Thus, once the price
quoted by the IoTSP becomes 0, the WSP can not increase its price without decreasing the demand since the IoTSP can
not decrease its price below 0. Hence, similar to the pull model (unlike in the push model), the WSP’s payoff becomes
independent of ba1 in the high advertisement revenue regime.
We now describe the results in detail.
1) Equilibrium Prices: NE strategy (p∗I , p∗w) at the sub-game 2:
Lemma 2. Under the unique NE at sub-game 2,
If pc(β + a2) > ba1 − Dmax
2d
, then
p∗I = min
{
Dmax
3d
− 2ba1
3
+
2pc(β + a2)
3
,
Dmax
d
}
(23)
p∗w = max
{
Dmax
3d(α+ a1)
+
ba1
3(α+ a1)
− pc(β + a2)
3(α+ a1)
, 0
}
(24)
If ba1 − Dmax
2d
≥ pc(β + a2), then
p∗I = 0, p
∗
w =
Dmax
2d(α+ a1)
(25)
The upper limit on p∗I appears because the demand becomes 0 when pI is higher than Dmax/d.
Pricing strategy of the CSP in sub-game 1:
Theorem 4. Under the unique NE in the sub-game 1,
When dba1 < 2Dmax,
p∗c =
ba1
2(β + a2)
+
Dmax
2d(β + a2)
(26)
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and when dba1 ≥ 2Dmax
p∗c =
ba1
β + a2
− Dmax
2d(β + a2)
(27)
Thus, from Lemma 2 and Theorem 4 we have
Theorem 5. Under the unique SPNE
p∗I =

2Dmax
3d
− ba1
3
if dba1 < 2Dmax
0, if dba1 ≥ 2Dmax
(28)
p∗w =

Dmax
6d(α+ a1)
+
ba1
6(α+ a1)
if dba1 < 2Dmax
Dmax
2d(α+ a1)
if dba1 ≥ 2Dmax
(29)
Note that here the SPNE is always unique similar to the pull model (unlike in the push model).
2) Payoffs of entities:
Corollary 5. When dba1 < 2Dmax:
Dhybrid =
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
UI,hybrid = Uw,hybrid = d
(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2
Uc,hybrid = 3d
(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2
Corollary 6. When dba1 ≥ 2Dmax:
Dhybrid = Dmax/2
UI,hybrid = Uw,hybrid =
D2max
4d
(30)
Uc,hybrid = (ba1 − Dmax
2d
)Dmax/2
Fig. 4 shows the variation of the payoffs of the IoTSP, WSP and CSP with ba1.
VI. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE IOTSP AND ADVERTISERS
Here, we describe the interaction between the IoTSP and advertisers. We first describe how a1 is obtained. The computing
resources a2 required for advertisement is a function of a1. Hence, a2 is readily obtained once a1 is selected.
There are M advertising firms who are interested in advertising. An advertising firm may or may not advertise. If an
advertising firm decides to advertise, then it advertises a volume of c unit to each end-user. Without loss of generality, we
assume that c = 1. Hence, the total advertising volume to each end-user, a1 is simply the number of advertising firms who
advertise in the IoTSP. An advertiser also has to pay b amount to the IoTSP. The advertising firm does not pay the WSP or
CSP. The IoTSP first decides b, then, a firm decides to advertise or not. A firm will only advertise if its expected revenue12 is
greater than b. Note that advertising firms may have different valuations, however they advertise the same amount13 c. Hence,
the number of firms which will advertise is a decreasing function of b. We assume that the number of advertising firms or a1
is given by
a1 = min(Amax, G(b)) (31)
where Amax is the maximum advertisement allowed which arises because the end-users do not prefer advertisement volume
above a threshold, G(·) is a decreasing function. We also assume that G(bmax) = 0. Thus, there is an upper limit on b. Since
we assume that a1 and b are selected from a closed interval, ba1 has at least one maximum.
The advertising model that we consider is motivated by some of the existing models in the legacy technologies such as
the internet. For example, i) in the current internet model, end-users have to pay the WSP for advertisement volume (e.g.
Youtube, Netflix). The advertisers only pay (b) the content providers (e.g. Youtube, Netflix). ii) In the app market, advertisers
pay the app developers the price (b) quoted by them, the end-users have to pay the WSP for the advertising volume. In both
12The expected revenue in general depends on the probability that an end-user will buy the product and the price of the product.
13We relax this assumption in the future.
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TABLE I
MOST PREFERABLE MODEL FOR VARIOUS ENTITIES IN DIFFERENT ADVERTISEMENT REVENUE REGIME.
Entities Sufficiently Low ba1 Sufficiently High ba1
End-users Pull Push
IoTSP Pull Pull
WSP Pull Push
CSP Hybrid Hybrid or Push
Advertisers Pull Push
the models, the advertisers whose valuations are larger than b participate in the advertising, the rest do not. The advertising
volume (c) is also often the same for each advertising firm.
Now, we characterize the optimal pricing strategy b of IoTSP for online advertisers. The IoTSP sets its price b with the
knowledge of (31).
We first consider the push model. The payoff of the IoTSP increases monotonically with ba1 when ba1 ≤ 5Dmax/d
(Corollary 1). However, the payoff of the IoTSP becomes independent of ba1 when ba1 > 5Dmax/d (Corollary 2). Thus, any
ba1 ≥ 5Dmax/d will maximize the payoff of the IoTSP. Hence, there can be multiple b which maximize the payoff of the
IoTSP. However, if the maximum value of ba1 is less than 5Dmax, then the payoff of the IoTSP is maximized only at the
maximum value of ba1.
In the pull model, the payoff of IoTSP always monotonically increases with ba1 (Corollaries 3 and 4). Hence, only the
maximum value of ba1 will maximize the payoff of the IoTSP. If there is a unique maximizer of ba1, then there is a unique b
which maximizes the payoff of the IoTSP. On the other hand, if there are more than one b which maximize the ba1, then all
those b will also maximize the payoff of the IoTSP.
In the hybrid model, the characteristic of the payoff of the IoTSP is similar to the push model, the only difference in
the hybrid model is that the payoff of the IoTSP becomes independent of ba1 when ba1 > 2Dmax/d instead of 5Dmax/d
(Corollaries 5 and 6). Note that in each model, the IoTSP’s payoff is maximized at the maximum value of ba1. Thus, the
payoff is maximized at least at b which maximizes14 ba1.
VII. COMPARISON AMONG DIFFERENT MODELS
We now compare different interaction models to provide insights which model will be preferable to different entities. The
significance of the above characterization is immense to the policy maker, and the entities. For example, if the market is
regulated, the policy maker would like to maximize its own objective. If the objective is to increase consumer welfare it would
like to know the model where the demand will be the highest. On the other hand if the object is to incentivize a provider
(IoTSP, WSP or CSP) to participate, it needs to know the interaction model which fetches the highest payoff to the provider.
If the market is free, the providers and the advertising firms want to adopt the interaction models which give them the highest
payoff. Thus, the providers and the advertising firms want to know the interaction models where their payoffs will be the
highest.
We first compare the demand of end-users (Corollary 7) in different interaction models. Subsequently, we compare the
payoffs of the IoTSP (Corollary 8), the WSP (Corollary 9), the CSP (Corollary 10) and the advertisers (Section VII-E) in
different interaction models.
We present the result in terms of the chosen ba1. We have discussed in the last section that the IoTSP selects a b which
maximizes ba1 in each model. Note that a1 is decreasing function of b, thus, ba1 is not maximized at the maximum value of
b. Table I shows the most preferable model for each entity for high and low values of ba1.
A. The demand of end-users
Corollary 7. • When dba1 < Dmax, Dpull > Dpush = Dhybrid.
• When dba1 = Dmax, Dpull = Dpush = Dhybrid.
• When 2Dmax >= dba1 > Dmax, Dpush = Dhybrid > Dpull
• When dba1 > 2Dmax, Dpush > Dhybrid > Dpull.
At initial stages of deployment of IoT technology, it is expected that ba1 will be small. Thus, if a social planner wants to
increase the reach of the IoT technology it may recommend the pull model at initial stages. When ba1 becomes sufficiently
high, the social planner then may recommend the push model.
The demand of end-users decreases with the payment that an end-user incurs. Corollary 7 is consistent with the above fact.
When ba1 is small (large, resp.) the total payment that an end-user incurs is larger (smaller, resp.) in the push and hybrid
models compared to the pull model (Theorems 2,3, 5). Thus, the demand in the push and hybrid model is lower (higher, resp.)
compared to the pull model when ba1 is low (high, resp.).
14The above behavior can also be observed in some legacy technologies. For example, Google and Facebook select b in order to maximize the advertisement
revenue from each user i.e. ba1.
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Fig. 5. Figure shows the variation of the demand of end-users with ba1 in different interaction models in the same example setting as considered in Fig. 2.
Fig. 6. Comparison of UI,push, UI,pull and UI,hybrid for the same example setting in fig. 2. UI,pull is the highest. UI,push = UI,hybrid when
ba1 ≤ 2Dmax/d = 30, UI,push > UI,hybrid when ba1 > 30.
The total payment that an end-user incurs in the hybrid model is the same as in the push model when dba1 ≤ 2Dmax
(Theorems 2 and 5), thus, the demand in the push and the hybrid model are the same. When dba1 > 2Dmax, then an end-user
has to pay a lower amount in the push model, thus the demand in the push model becomes higher compared to the hybrid
model (Theorems 2 and 5).
B. The IoTSP’s payoff
Corollary 8.
dba1 ≤ 2Dmax, UI,pull > UI,push = UI,hybrid.
dba1 > 2Dmax, UI,pull > UI,push > UI,hybrid.
Note that the payoff of the IoTSP is the highest in the pull model. In the pull model, the IoTSP does not have to share
its revenue with the CSP or WSP, thus, the payoff is the highest in the pull model in the low advertisement revenue regime
compared to the push and hybrid models (Corollaries 1,3, and 5). For high ba1, the payoff of the IoTSP becomes independent
of ba1 in the push and hybrid models, but in the pull model, the payoff of the IoTSP always strictly increases with ba1
(Corollaries 2, 4, and 6). Thus, the payoff in the pull model is also the highest when ba1 is high. When dba1 > 2Dmax, the
demand is higher and the IoTSP can gain a higher share of the advertisement revenue in the push model compared to the
hybrid model (Corollaries 2, and 6). Hence, the payoff of the IoTSP is higher in the push model compared to the hybrid model
when dba1 > 2Dmax (Fig. 6).
C. Payoff of the WSP
Recall that Uw,worst,push is the worst possible payoff of the WSP in the push model.
Corollary 9. • When 0.414Dmax > dba1, Uw,pull > Uw,push > Uw,hybrid .
• At dba1 = 0.414Dmax, Uw,pull = Uw,push > Uw,hybrid.
• When Dmax > dba1 > 0.414Dmax, Uw,push > Uw,pull > Uw,hybrid.
• When dba1 = Dmax, Uw,push > Uw,pull = Uw,hybrid.
• When 5Dmax > dba1 > Dmax, Uw,push > Uw,hybrid > Uw,pull.
• When dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, Uw,worst,push > Uw,hybrid > Uw,pull.
Though the WSP is a leader in the push model, the payoff of the WSP is lower in the push model compared to the pull
model when ba1 is small. This is because, when ba1 is small the demand is low which fetches a lower payoff to the WSP
in the push model compared to the pull model. With increase in ba1, the payoff of the WSP increases at a higher rate in the
push model compared to the pull model (Corollaries 1, and 3). Thus, the WSP’s payoff becomes higher in the push model
compared to the pull model in the high advertisement revenue regime. The price set by the WSP is always higher in the push
model compared to the hybrid model (Theorems 1, and 5), thus, the payoff of the WSP is always higher in the push model
compared to the hybrid model.
Note that the WSP quotes its price to the end users both in the pull model and hybrid model. However, when ba1 is small
(high, resp.) the demand in the hybrid model is small (high, resp.) compared to the pull model, thus, the payoff of the WSP is
higher (lower, resp.) in the pull model. Note that when ba1 ≥ 5Dmax/d, then the payoff of the WSP is not unique in the push
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model as the equilibrium is not unique (Theorem 1) and depends on the equilibrium selected. However, from Corollaries 2, 4,
and 6, the worst case payoff of the WSP in the push model is the highest. Hence, irrespective of the equilibrium selected, the
payoff of the WSP is the highest in the push model when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax.
D. The CSP’s payoff
In the push model, since the SPNE may not be unique when dba1 > 5Dmax (Theorem 1), the payoff of the CSP is not
unique and will depend on the choice of an equilibrium. Thus, we compare with the worst possible payoff (Uc,worst,push) and
the best possible payoff (Uc,best,push) of the CSP in the push model.
Corollary 10. • When dba1 < 0.414Dmax, Uc,hybrid > Uc,pull > Uc,push.
• At dba1 = 0.414Dmax, Uc,hybrid > Uc,pull = Uc,push.
• When 5.5Dmax > dba1 > 0.414Dmax, Uc,hybrid > Uc,push > Uc,pull.
• When dba1 ≥ 5.5Dmax, Uc,hybrid > Uc,worst,push > Uc,pull.
• When dba1 = 5.5Dmax, Uc,hybrid = Uc,best,push > Uc,pull.
• When dba1 > 5.5Dmax, Uc,best,push > Uc,hybrid > Uc,pull.
Since the CSP along with the WSP are leaders of the game in the push model, the comparison between the payoffs of
the CSP in the push and pull model is similar to that of the WSP. However, since the CSP is the only leader in the hybrid
model, it can select higher prices and still it can attain a higher payoff in the hybrid model compared to the push and pull
model for small values of ba1(Corollaries 1, 3, and 5). For high ba1, the CSP’s payoff increases linearly with ba1 in the hybrid
model, whereas Uc,worst,push (Corollary 2) and Uc,pull (Corollary 4) become independent of ba1. Thus, Uc,hybrid is higher
compared to Uc,pull and Uc,worst,push for high ba1. However, the best possible payoff of the CSP in the push model is higher
compared to the payoff in the hybrid model when dba1 > 5.5Dmax. This is because the best possible payoff of the CSP in the
push model also increases linearly with the advertisement revenue (Corollary 2) and the demand in the push model is higher
compared to the hybrid model when dba1 > 5.5Dmax (Corollary 7) .
E. Expected payoff of the advertisers
Recall from Section VI that each advertising firm decides whether to participate in advertising or not. Advertising firm i
gets an expected revenue ri from each end-user if it decides to advertise. If the advertising firm does not participate, then it
will get a revenue of 0 from each end-user. The advertising firm also has to pay b if it decides to participate. Thus, the total
expected payoff of advertising firm i is–
(ri − b) ∗D if firm i participates
0 otherwise (32)
where D is the total demand of the end-users. Hence, the expected payoff of all participating advertising firms increases with
the increase in the demand of end-users.
Note from Corollary 7 that the demand of end-users depend on ba1, the total advertisement revenue for each user. The
demand will impact the revenue of participating advertising firms and thus, it should impact the number of participating firms
a1. However, we consider that a1 is not a strategic decision and is a function of only b (recall (31)). We now justify it. In
practice, each advertising firm is an independent entity and there is no coordination among different advertising firms. Each
advertising firm only maximizes its own payoff and thus, it decides to participate based on its own expected revenue from each
end-user and b. Thus, the number of participating advertising firms a1 is a function of only b.There is no central controller
which coordinates among the advertising firms to select a1 to maximize the sum of the payoffs of the advertising firms. Hence,
a1 is not a strategic decision.
Recall that the IoTSP selects b which maximizes ba1. For a given b, from (32) the total expected payoff of each participating
firm15 is a non-decreasing function of the demand D. Now from Corollary 7, when the chosen ba1 is low (high, resp.) then the
total demand is the highest (lowest, resp.) in the pull model. Thus, when chosen ba1 is low (high,resp.) , the payoff of each
participating advertising firm is the highest (lowest, resp.) in the pull model. When ba1 > 2Dmax/d, the demand and thus,
total expected payoff of a participating advertiser is higher in the push model compared to the hybrid otherwise, the demand
and thus, the total expected payoffs of a participating advertiser are equal in the push and hybrid model (by Corollary 7).
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now numerically evaluate the demand of end-users, and the payoff of the providers as a function of ba1 in an example
scenario.
Fig. 5 reveals that the demand of end-users is the highest (lowest, resp.) in the pull model for low (high, resp.) advertisement
revenue regime which we also found in Corollary 7. As Corollary 7 suggests the demand in the push model is higher (the
15A firm will participate only if ri ≥ b.
15
Fig. 7. Comparison of Uw,worst,push, Uw,pull, and Uw,hybrid for the same example setting in Fig. 2. For dba1 ≤ 5Dmax = 75, the WSP’s
payoff is unique in the push model, thus, Uw,worst,push = Uw,push.
Fig. 8. Figure in the left side shows the CSP’s payoff in different interaction models for small values of ba1 (ba1 ≤ 22) for the same
example setting in Fig. 2. The figure in the right hand side shows the CSP’s payoff in different interaction models for higher values of ba1
(ba1 > 22) for the same example setting in Fig. 2. Since when dba1 > 5Dmax = 75, the payoff of the IoTSP is not unique in the push
model, we plot the best and worst possible payoffs.
same, resp.) when ba1 > 2Dmax/d (ba1 ≤ 2Dmax/d, resp.) compared to the hybrid model. Thus, the demand is the highest
in the push model when dba1 > 2Dmax.
Fig. 6 shows that the payoff of the IoTSP is the highest in the pull model (Corollary 8). The payoff of the IoTSP is higher
in the push model compared to the hybrid model when ba1 > 2Dmax/d otherwise it is equal as we found in Corollary 8.
Fig. 6 reveals that the difference between the payoffs in the push (or, hybrid) and pull model strictly increases with ba1.
Fig. 7 shows the variation of the WSP’s payoff with ba1 in different interaction models. Since Uw,push is not unique
when dba1 > 5Dmax, we plot the worst case payoff of the WSP. Uw,push is unique when dba1 ≤ 5Dmax, hence, the worst
case payoff in this region is equal to Uw,push. Note that even the worst case payoff of the WSP in the push model is the
highest when dba1 > 5Dmax as suggested in Corollary 9. Thus, irrespective of the equilibrium selected in the push model for
ba1 > 5Dmax/d, the payoff of the WSP is the highest in the push model. However, the payoff of the WSP is the highest in
the pull model for small values of ba1. The payoff of the WSP is higher (lower, resp.) in the hybrid model compared to the
pull model for higher (lower, resp.) values of ba1 as suggested in Corollary 9.
Fig. 8 shows the variation of the CSP’s payoff with ba1 in different interaction models. It shows that the payoff of the CSP is
the highest in the hybrid model for low values of ba1 (Corollary 10). The payoff of the CSP is higher (lower, resp.) in the pull
model compared to the push model for small (large, resp.) values of ba1. When dba1 ≤ 5Dmax, the payoff the CSP is unique
in the push model, thus, the worst and best possible payoffs of the CSP are identical in the push model (Corollary 1). However,
the worst and best possible payoffs of the CSP are not identical when dba1 > 5Dmax in the push model (Corollary 2). The best
possible payoff of the CSP in the push model exceeds the payoff in the hybrid model when ba1 > 5.5Dmax/d. However, the
worst possible payoff of the CSP in the push model is lower than the payoff in the hybrid model as we found in Corollary 10.
IX. FUTURE WORK
Generalization of our framework to account for an oligopolistic setting is a work for the future. In future we also consider
the non-linear demand response models. The bandwidth of the WSP is a scarce resource. Due to the proliferation of the IoT a
large amount of bandwidth is required. In the future, the WSP may need to procure additional bandwidth from the secondary
market in exchange of some fee. Thus, the WSP also has to decide over additional bandwidth to be procured apart from the
price it will charge the IoTSP or the end-users. The characterization of the equilibrium pricing strategies in the above setting
is also a work for the future. The framework that we have developed will provide a basis for solving the above problems.
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APPENDIX
We show the results stated in Section III in Appendix A, results stated in Section IV in Appendix B, results stated in
Section V in Appendix C, and results stated in Section VII in Appendix D.
A. Proofs of Results in Section III
We first prove Lemma 1; subsequently we prove Theorem 1. Finally, we show Corollaries 1 and 2.
We use the following result throughout this section. Note from (1) and (2) that
UI,push = pI(Dmax − dpI) + ba1(Dmax − dpI)−
pw(α+ a1)(Dmax − dpI)− pc(β + a2)(Dmax − dpI) (33)
Now we are ready to show Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: From the first order condition and (33), we must have at NE
p∗I =
Dmax
2d
− ba1
2
+
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
(34)
Note that when IoTSP selects price pI it knows pw, pc. Since the UI,push is strictly concave in pI by (33) thus the first order
condition is both necessary and sufficient for optimality. Thus, (34) is also the optimal price for IoTSP if it is non-negative.
If the right hand side of (34) is negative then p∗I = 0. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 1: We prove the theorem by considering three cases:
(i) We first show that an NE can not arise in the case where
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
<
ba1
2
− Dmax
2d
since in this case
either the WSP or the CSP can increases its price without decreasing the demand Dpush and thus, can gain higher payoff by
unilaterally deviating from the strategy profile (Step 1).
(ii) We next consider the case when
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
>
ba1
2
− Dmax
2d
(Step 2). In this case we first obtain the
expression of Dpush, Uw,push, and Uc,push from (34) (Step 2a). Subsequently, we characterize the equilibrium strategy profile
from the first order condition since the payoffs are strictly concave in this case (Step 2b).
(iii) Finally we consider the case when
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
=
ba1
2
− Dmax
2d
(Step 3). We obtain the expression of
Dpush and Uw,push, Uc,push using (34) (Step 3a). The first order condition is no longer sufficient in this case since the payoffs
are not strictly concave, nevertheless we characterize the equilibrium prices and the necessary and sufficient conditions required
for the equilibrium (Step 3b).
The detailed proof is given below:
Step 1: If
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
<
ba1
2
− Dmax
2d
then p∗I = 0 by (5) and thus from (1) the demand becomes
Dpush = Dmax − dpI = Dmax (35)
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Thus, CSP’s payoff is
pc(β + a2)Dmax
which is a strictly increasing function in pc. Since pc(β+a2) < ba1−Dmax/d−pw(α+a1),thus, we can always find a small
enough  > 0 such that (pc + )(β + a2) < ba1 −Dmax/d− pw(α+ a1), but the payoff at pc +  is (pc + )(β + a2)Dmax
which is strictly higher than the payoff at price pc which contradicts the fact that pc is an NE. Thus, NE can not arise in this
case.
Step 2: We now consider the case
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
>
ba1
2
− Dmax
2d
(36)
Step 2a: Replacing the value of p∗I from (5) in (1) we get
Dpush =
Dmax
2
− d
(
−ba1
2
+
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
)
(37)
Using (37), (3), and (4) we can easily show that
Uw,push = pw(α+ a1)(
Dmax
2
−
d(−ba1
2
+
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
)) (38)
Uc,push = pc(β + a2)(
Dmax
2
− d(−ba1
2
+
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
)) (39)
Step 2b: The payoff functions of the WSP and CSP are strictly concave in pw and pc respectively in this case. Thus, the first
order condition is also the sufficient one if they satisfy the condition in (36). Thus, at NE pricing strategy (p∗w, p
∗
c), we must
have from the first order condition
p∗w =
Dmax
2d(α+ a1)
− p
∗
c(β + a2)
2(α+ a1)
+
ba1
2(α+ a1)
p∗c =
Dmax
2d(β + a2)
− p
∗
w(α+ a1)
2(β + a2)
+
ba1
2(β + a2)
given that (p∗w, p
∗
c) satisfy condition in (36). Further simplification leads to
p∗w =
Dmax
3d(α+ a1)
+
ba1
3(α+ a1)
(40)
p∗c =
Dmax
3d(β + a2)
+
ba1
3(β + a2)
(41)
Note that condition (36) is satisfied when
p∗c(β + a2) + p
∗
w(α+ a1) > ba1 −Dmax/d
ba1 < 5Dmax/d (42)
Thus, the NE strategy profile exists in this case only when dba1 < 5Dmax.
Step 3: We now consider the case
pw(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
=
ba1
2
− Dmax
2d
(43)
Step 3a:Here, p∗I = 0 by (5). Thus, the demand becomes
D = Dmax − dp∗I = Dmax (44)
So, WSP’s payoff and CSP’s payoff is
Uw,push = pw(α+ a1)Dmax
Uc,push = pc(β + a2)Dmax (45)
Step 3b: Now, we will find out the conditions for which (pw, pc) is an NE in this case. To this end, we have to rule out any
profitable unilateral deviation by either WSP or CSP.
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We first show that when the WSP selects a price less than pw, then the WSP’s payoff will be strictly less than the payoff at
pw (Case iii.a). Subsequently, we find the conditions which ensure that the WSP will not have any profitable deviation when
it selects a price higher than pw (Case iii.b). Due to the symmetry, the analysis for the CSP will be similar.
Case iii.a: If the WSP selects a lower price x, then by condition in (43), x(α+a1)/2+pc(β+a2)/2 < ba1/2−Dmax/(2d)
i.e. it satisfies the condition in case i. Thus, p∗I = 0. Thus, the WSP’s payoff becomes x(α + a1)Dmax which is strictly less
than pw(α+ a1) since x < pw. Thus, the WSP has no incentive to lower its price.
Case iii b: Now, we obtain the condition under which the WSP will not have any incentive to select a price larger than pw.
Suppose WSP selects price x > pw, thus, x(α+ a1)+ pc(β+ a2) > ba1−Dmax; i.e it satisfies the condition in case ii. Thus,
from (38) the WSP’s payoff at the price x is
x(α+ a1)
(
Dmax
2
− d
(
−ba1
2
+
x(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
))
Now, using (43) in place of pc(β + a2), the above expression can be written as
x(α+ a1)(Dmax/2
−d(−Dmax
2d
− pw(α+ a1)/2 + x(α+ a1)/2)) (46)
Hence, there will be no profitable unilateral deviation if payoff at pw is greater than or equal to the payoff at x, thus from
(45) and (46), we must have
(α+ a1)(pw − x)(Dmax − dx(α+ a1)/2) ≥ 0 (47)
Since x > pw, thus the above condition will be satisfied only when 2Dmax/d ≤ x(α+ a1). If 2Dmax/d > pw(α+ a1), then,
we can find x > pw such that x(α+a1) < 2Dmax/d. Hence, for no profitable unilateral deviation for the WSP, we must have
2Dmax/d ≤ pw(α + a1). Similarly, we can also show that for no profitable unilateral deviation for the CSP, we must have
2Dmax/d ≤ pc(β + a2). Now if pw(α+ a1) > ba1 − 3Dmax/d, then by (43)
pc(β + a2) < 2Dmax/d
Thus, we must have pw(α+ a1) ≤ ba1 − 3Dmax/d .
Again, since pw(α+ a1) ≥ 2Dmax/d, thus, for feasible pw we must have 2Dmax/d ≥ ba1− 3Dmax/d i.e. dba1 ≥ 5Dmax
i.e. this case can arise only when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax. Similarly, in order to satisfy the condition that pw(α+ a1) ≥ 2Dmax/d and
(43), we must have pc(α + a1) ≤ ba1 − 3Dmax/d. Since pc(β + a2) ≥ 2Dmax/d, thus, similarly pc is feasible only when
dba1 ≥ 5Dmax.
Thus, from case iii.b an NE can exist in this case only when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax and the NE strategy (p∗w, p∗c) must be of the
following from
p∗w(α+ a1) ∈ [2Dmax/d, ba1 − 3Dmax/d]
p∗c(β + a2) ∈ [2Dmax/d, ba1 − 3Dmax/d]
such that p∗c(β + a2) + p
∗
w(α+ a1) = ba1 −Dmax/d
The last equality comes from (43). Note that when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, there may exist multiple NE pricing strategy in this
sub-game. However, when dba1 = 5Dmax then, the NE strategy becomes unique, p∗w(α+ a1) = p
∗
c(β + a1) = 2Dmax/d.
Hence, from case ii, when dba1 < 5Dmax, the NE strategy must be of the form given in (6)-(7) and from case iii, when
dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, then NE strategy profile must be of the form given in (8)-(9).
Proof of Corollary 1 We first obtain the expression of Dpush from (5) and (1) when dba1 < 5Dmax. Using the value of
Dpush and Theorems 1 and 2 we subsequently obtain the values of UI,push, Uw,push and Uc,push.
From (5) and (1) we obtain
Dpush = Dmax − dpI = Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
(48)
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We now obtain the expression of UI,push when dba1 < 5Dmax. From (2), (5), (6),(7) and (48) we obtain
UI,push = (
5Dmax
6d
− ba1
6
)(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
+ ba1(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
− ( Dmax
3d(α+ a1)
+
ba1
3(α+ a1)
)(α+ a1)(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
− ( Dmax
3d(β + a2)
+
ba1
3(β + a2)
)(β + a2)(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
UI,push = (
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
UI,push = d(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2 (49)
Now, we obtain the expression of Uw,push when dba1 < 5Dmax. We obtain from (3),(6) and (48)
Uw,push = p
∗
w(α+ a1)(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
= (
Dmax
3d
+
ba1
3
)(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
= 2d
(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2
(50)
Similarly from (4), (7) and (48) we obtain
Uc,push = 2d(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2 (51)
Corollary 1 readily follows from (48)-(51).
Proof of Corollary 2 We first obtain the expression of the equilibrium value of Dpush by plugging in the value of equilibrium
p∗I from (5) when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax. We obtain the expression of UI,push using the equilibrium value of demand and (10). The
payoffs of the WSP and CSP are not unique in the push model when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax since the equilibrium is not unique
(Theorem 2). We obtain the worst case and best possible payoffs of the WSP and CSP from Theorem 1 and the equilibrium
demand when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax. Finally, we show that the sum of the payoffs of the WSP and CSP are unique and obtain the
expression.
When dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, then p∗I = 0 by (5), the equilibrium demand is thus-
Dpush =Dmax − dpI = Dmax (52)
Now, we obtain the expression of the UI,push. Note that p∗w(α + a1) + p
∗
c(β + a2) is equal to ba1 −Dmax/d by (10) when
dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, thus from (2) and (5) we obtain
UI,push =0 ∗Dpush + ba1Dpush−
(p∗w(α+ a1) + p
∗
c(β + a2))Dpush
=
D2max
d
(from (52)) (53)
We now obtain the worst and the best possible payoffs of the WSP and CSP. Note from (8) and (9) that the lowest possible
values for pw(α + a1) and pc(β + a2) are 2Dmax/d. Thus, from (52) the worst possible payoffs for WSP and CSP are
respectively-
U˜w,push =
2D2max
d
(54)
U˜c,push =
2D2max
d
(55)
Similarly note from (8) and (9) the the highest possible values of pw(α+ a1) and pc(β+ a2) are ba1− 3Dmax/d. Thus, from
(52) the best possible payoffs of the WSP and CSP are respectively
Uw,best,push = (ba1 − 3Dmax/d)Dmax (56)
Uc,best,push = (ba1 − 3Dmax/d)Dmax (57)
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From (10) and (52) we obtain
(p∗w(α+ a1) + pc(β + a2))Dpush = ba1Dmax −
D2max
d
(58)
Corollary 2 readily follows from (52)-(58).
B. Proofs of Results in Section IV
We first prove Theorem 3. Subsequently we prove Corollaries 3 and 4..
Proof of Theorem 3 We first obtain the expressions of UI,pull, Uw,pull and Uc,pull using (14), (15), (16) and (17) (Step
1). The payoffs are strictly concave in their respective decision variables, hence, the first order conditions are necessary and
sufficient. From the first order condition, we show that only p∗I can be 0 (Step 2). Subsequently, we characterize the equilibrium
prices in two different cases when p∗I > 0 and when p
∗
I = 0 respectively (Steps 3 and 4). The detailed proof is given below:
Step 1 First, we obtain the expression of UI,pull. Replacing (14) in (15) we obtain
UI,pull = pI(Dmax − d(pI + pw(α+ a1) + pc(β + a2)))
+ba1(Dmax − d(pI + pw(α+ a1) + pc(β + a2)))
Now, we obtain the expressions of Uw,pull and Uc,pull. Replacing (14) in (16) and (17) we also obtain
Uw,pull = pw(α+ a1)(Dmax
−d(pI + pw(α+ a1) + pc(β + a2)))
Uc,pull = pc(β + a2)(Dmax
−d(pI + pw(α+ a1) + pc(β + a2)))
Step 2: From the first order condition
p∗I = max{
Dmax
2d
− p
∗
w(α+ a1)
2
− p
∗
c(β + a2)
2
− ba1
2
, 0} (59)
p∗w = max{
Dmax
2d(α+ a1)
− p
∗
I
2(α+ a1)
− p
∗
c(β + a2)
2(α+ a1)
, 0}
p∗c = max{
Dmax
2d(β + a2)
− p
∗
I
2(β + a2)
− p
∗
w(α+ a1)
2(β + a2)
, 0}
Note that p∗I ≤ Dmax/2d and p∗c(β+a2) ≤ Dmax/2d. Thus,
Dmax
2d(α+ a1)
− p
∗
I
2(α+ a1)
− p
∗
c(β + a2)
2(α+ a1)
≥ 0. Thus, we can write
p∗w as
p∗w =
Dmax
2d(α+ a1)
− p
∗
I
2(α+ a1)
− p
∗
c(β + a2)
2(α+ a1)
(60)
Similarly, we can show that
p∗c =
Dmax
2d(β + a2)
− p
∗
I
2(β + a2)
− p
∗
w(α+ a1)
2(β + a2)
(61)
It is easy to discern that UI,pull, Uw,pull and Uc,pull are strictly concave in pI , pw and pc respectively , thus, the first order
condition is also sufficient. Thus, (59)-(61) are optimal.
We consider the following two cases
Step 3: case i: We first consider that
Dmax
2d
− p
∗
w(α+ a1)
2
− p
∗
c(β + a2)
2
− ba1
2
≥ 0. In this case solving for NE strategy
profile (p∗I , p
∗
c , p
∗
w) from (59)-(61), we obtain
p∗I =
Dmax
4d
− 3ba1
4
(62)
p∗w =
Dmax
4d(α+ a1)
+
ba1
4(α+ a1)
(63)
p∗c =
Dmax
4d(β + a2)
+
ba1
4(β + a2)
(64)
From (63) and (64) note that this case only arises when dba1 ≤ Dmax/3.
Step 4: case ii: Now, we consider the case
Dmax
2d
− p
∗
w(α+ a1)
2
− p
∗
c(β + a2)
2
− ba1
2
< 0.
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From (59),
p∗I = 0 (65)
Solving for p∗w and p
∗
c with putting p
∗
I = 0 we obtain
p∗w =
Dmax
3d(α+ a1)
(66)
p∗c =
Dmax
3d(β + a2)
(67)
Note that
Dmax
2d
− pw(α+ a1)
2
− pc(β + a2)
2
− ba1
2
=
Dmax
6d
− ba1
2
< 0 (when dba1 > Dmax/3d)
Thus, this case arises only when dba1 >
Dmax
3d
. Thus from case i and ii, we obtain when dba1 ≤ Dmax/3, then the NE price
strategy must be of the form given in (62)-(64) and when dba1 > Dmax/3, then the NE price strategy is of the form given in
(65)-(67). Proof of Corollary 3 We first obtain the expression of Dpull at the equilibrium from Theorem 3 when
dba1 ≤ Dmax/3. Subsequently, we obtain the expression of the value of UI,pull, Uw,pull and Uc,pull at the equilibrium using
the already obtained expression of Dpull and Theorem 3.
When dba1 ≤ Dmax/3, then the equilibrium demand from (14), and Theorem 3 is
Dpull = Dmax − d(Dmax
4d
− 3ba1
4
+
Dmax
4d
+
ba1
4
+
Dmax
4d
+
ba1
4
)
=
Dmax
4
+ d
ba1
4
(68)
Now, we obtain the equilibrium value of UI,pull. From (68), (15) and Theorem 3, we obtain
UI,pull = (
Dmax
4d
− 3ba1
4
)(
Dmax
4
+ d
ba1
4
)
+ ba1(
Dmax
4
+ d
ba1
4
)
= d
(
Dmax
4d
+
ba1
4
)2
(69)
Now, we obtain the expressions of the equilibrium payoffs of the WSP and CSP. From (16), (17) and Theorem 3 we obtain
Uw,pull = d(
Dmax
4d
+
ba1
4
)2 (70)
Uc,pull = d(
Dmax
4d
+
ba1
4
)2 (71)
Hence, the result directly follows from (68)-(71).
Proof of Corollary 4 Similar to Corollary 3 we first obtain the expression of the demand at the equilibrium pricing strategy
using Theorem 3. Subsequently, we obtain the expressions of the UI,pull, Uw,pull and Uc,pull using the expression of demand
and Theorem 3 when dba1 > Dmax/3.
When dba1 > Dmax/3, then by Theorem 3 p∗I = 0, thus, by Theorem 3 and (14) we obtain
Dpull = Dmax − d(Dmax
3d
+
Dmax
3d
) =
Dmax
3
(72)
Now, we obtain the expression of UI,pull for dba1 > Dmax/3. From Theorem 3 and (15) we obtain
UI,pull =pI
Dmax
3
+ ba1
Dmax
3
= ba1
Dmax
3
(73)
Now, we obtain the expressions of Uw,pull and Uc,pull respectively when dba1 > Dmax/3. From (16), (72), and Theorem 3,
we obtain
Uw,pull =pw(α+ a1)Dmax/3 = D
2
max/9d (74)
From (17), (72), and Theorem 3 we obtain
Uc,pull =pc(β + a2)Dmax/3 = D
2
max/9d (75)
The result readily follows from (72)-(75).
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C. Proofs of Results in Section V
We first show Lemma 2 and Theorem 4. Using those results we outline the proofs of Corollaries 5 and 6.
Proof of Lemma 2: We first obtain the expressions of the payoffs of the IoTSP and WSP using the expression of Dhybrid
in (20) and (21) (Step 1). Subsequently, we show that UI,hybrid and Uw,hybrid are strictly concave in pI and pw respectively,
thus, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient (Step 2). We characterize the equilibrium prices p∗I , p
∗
w for a given pc
in two possible cases depending on whether p∗I is positive or 0 (Step 3). The detailed proof is given below.
Step 1: Using (19) in (20) and (21), we obtain
UI,hybrid = (pI + ba1 − pc(β + a2))(Dmax − d(pI + pw(α+ a1)))
Uw,hybrid = pw(α+ a1)(Dmax − d(pI + pw(α+ a1)))
Step 2: Note that UI,hybrid and Uw,hybrid are strictly concave in pI and pw respectively. Thus, the first order condition is
necessary and sufficient for optimality. Note that IoTSP and WSP simultaneously select price knowing pc. Since p∗I , p
∗
w are
non negative, thus, from the first order condition–
p∗I = max{
Dmax
2d
− p
∗
w(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
− ba1
2
, 0} (76)
p∗w = max{
Dmax
2d(α+ a1)
− p
∗
I
2(α+ a1)
, 0} (77)
Note that p∗I ≤ Dmax/d, otherwise the demand will be 0. Thus,
p∗w =
Dmax
2d(α+ a1)
− p
∗
I
2(α+ a1)
(78)
Step 3: We analyze two possible cases:
Case i:
Dmax
2d
− p
∗
w(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
− ba1
2
> 0.
We obtain from (76) and (77) at NE strategy (p∗I , p
∗
w):
p∗I =
Dmax
3d
− 2ba1
3
+
2pc(β + a2)
3
p∗w =
Dmax
3d(α+ a1)
+
ba1
3(α+ a1)
− pc(β + a2)
3(α+ a1)
Since p∗I ≤ Dmax/d, thus, pc(β + a2) ≤
Dmax
d
+ ba1. Thus, this case only arises when pc(β + a2) > ba1 − Dmax
2d
and
pc(β + a2) ≤ Dmax
d
+ ba1.
Case ii:
Dmax
2d
− p
∗
w(α+ a1)
2
+
pc(β + a2)
2
− ba1
2
≤ 0.
By (76), p∗I = 0, thus, we always have Dmax > dp
∗
I and thus, p
∗
w > 0 by (77) . By (77), we also obtain
p∗w =
Dmax
2d(α+ a1)
(79)
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 4: There are two possible cases of p∗I and p
∗
w depending on p
∗
c as given in Lemma 2. We investigate each
such case, and characterize the equilibrium value of pc in each case if it exists.
i) We first consider the case where pc(β + a2) > ba1 − Dmax
2d
(Step 1). We show that the payoff of the CSP is strictly
concave function in pc in this case and thus, the first order condition is both necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium (Step
1a). We characterize the equilibrium in this case (Step 1b).
ii) We next consider the case pc(β+a2) ≤ ba1− Dmax
2d
(Step 2). In this case, the payoff function of the CSP is not strictly
concave in pc (Step 2a). We show that when pc(β+a2) < ba1−Dmax
2d
, then no NE exists since the CSP always has profitable
deviation (Step 2b). However, we show that when pc(β + a2) = ba1 − Dmax
2d
, then the equilibrium exists. We obtain the
necessary and sufficient condition for existence of the equilibrium (Step 2c).
Case i:
pc(β + a2) > ba1 − Dmax
2d
(80)
23
Step 1a: p∗I and p
∗
w are given by (23) and (24) respectively in Theorem 5. Replacing the values of p
∗
I and p
∗
w in (19) the
equilibrium demand becomes
Dhybrid =
Dmax
3
+ d(
ba1
3
− pc(β + a2)
3
) (81)
Hence, CSP’s payoff from (22) is
pc(β + a2)(
Dmax
3
+ d
ba1
3
− dpc(β + a2)
3
) (82)
Step 1b: From first order condition, we obtain
p∗c =
Dmax
2d(β + a2)
+
ba1
2(β + a2)
(83)
which is optimal by the strict concavity of (82).
Condition in (80) is satisfied when
Dmax
2d
+
ba1
2
> ba1 − Dmax
2d
i.e. dba1 < 2Dmax.
case ii: pc(β + a2) ≤ ba1 − Dmax
2d
:
Step 2a: In this case p∗I = 0 and p
∗
w(α+ a1) =
Dmax
2d
by (25). Hence, from (19) the equilibrium demand is
Dhybrid = Dmax/2 (84)
Thus, CSP’s payoff is
pc(β + a2)Dmax/2
which is strictly increasing in pc.
Step 2b: If pc(β + a2) < ba1 − Dmax
2d
is an NE price, then we can find a small enough  such that (pc + )(β + a2) <
ba1 − Dmax
2d
, thus at pc +  the payoff is (pc + )(β + a2)Dmax/2 which is strictly larger compared to the payoff at pc
contradicting the fact that pc is an NE. Thus, there is no NE at pc(β + a2) < ba1 − Dmax
2d
.
Step 2c: Now, we investigate the setting when
pc(β + a2) = ba1 − Dmax
2d
(85)
Thus, the CSP’s payoff is now
(ba1 − Dmax
2d
)Dmax/2 (86)
Now, for an NE strategy we have to rule out any profitable unilateral deviation by CSP. Toward this end we consider the two
following cases:
Case ii. a: First we rule out the possibility that the CSP selects a price x which is lower than pc (given in (85)).
Note that if x(β + a2) < ba1 − Dmax
2d
, then the optimal demand is Dmax/2. Hence, CSP’s payoff is x(β + a2)Dmax/2
which is strictly less than (86) since x(β+ a2) < ba1− Dmax
2d
. Thus, CSP does not have any incentive to select a price lower
than that of (85).
Case ii.b: Now, we obtain the condition under which CSP will not have any incentive to select a higher price compared to
pc (given in (85)).
If CSP selects price x > pc, then x(β + a2) > ba1 − Dmax
2d
and the condition in case i is satisfied, thus, IoTSP and WSP
will select the price according to (23) and (24) respectively with x in place of pc. Thus, CSP’s payoff becomes (from (82))
x(β + a2)(
Dmax
2
− Dmax
6
+ dba1/3− dx(β + a2)/3)
For no profitable unilateral deviation, we must have from (86)
(ba1 − Dmax
2d
− x(β + a2))(Dmax
2
− dx(β + a2)/3) ≥ 0
Since x(β+a2) > ba1−Dmax
2d
thus the above condition is satisfied only when 3
Dmax
2d
≤ x(β+a2). If ba1−Dmax
2d
< 3
Dmax
2d
,
then we can find a x such that 3
Dmax
2d
> x(β + a2) > ba1 − Dmax
2d
. Thus, we must have 3
Dmax
2d
≤ ba1 − Dmax
2d
or
dba1 ≥ 2Dmax. Thus, the above condition can only hold when dba1 ≥ 2Dmax.
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Thus from case i and ii, when dba1 < 2Dmax, then p∗c is given by (83); on the other hand, when dba1 ≥ 2Dmax, then the
NE strategy profile must be of the form given in (85). Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 5 First, we obtain the expression of the demand at the equilibrium pricing strategies using Theorem 5.
Subsequently, we obtain the expressions of the payoffs of the IoTSP, WSP and CSP at the equilibrium when dba1 < 2Dmax
using Theorems 4, 5 and the expression of Dhybrid.
From (19), and Theorem 5 the equilibrium demand is
Dhybrid = Dmax − d(p∗I + p∗w(α+ a1))
= Dmax − d(2Dmax
3d
− ba1/3 + ba1
6
+
Dmax
6d
)
=
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
(87)
Now, we obtain the expression of UI,hybrid and Uw,hybrid at the equilibrium. From (20), (87), and Theorem 5 we obtain
UI,hybrid = (
2Dmax
3d
− ba1
3
)(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
+ ba1(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
− (Dmax
2d
+
ba1
2
)(
Dmax
6
+ d
ba1
6
)
= d
(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2
(88)
Uw,hybrid = d(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2 (89)
Now, we obtain the expression of Uc,hybrid at the equilibrium. From (87) and (4) we obtain
Uc,hybrid = 3d(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2. (90)
The result follows from (87)-(90).
Proof of Corollary 6 Similar to Corollary 6 we obtain the expression of the demand at the equilibrium using Theorem 5
when dba1 ≥ 2Dmax. Subsequently, we obtain the expressions of UI,hybrid, Uw,hybrid and Uc,hybrid when dba1 ≥ 2Dmax
using Theorems 4 and 5.
From (19) and Theorem 5 we obtain
Dhybrid = Dmax − d(p∗I + p∗w(α+ a1))
=
Dmax
2
(91)
Now, we obtain the expression of UI,hybrid. From (20) and Theorems 4,5 we obtain
UI,hybrid = (ba1 − pc(β + a2))Dmax
2
=
D2max
4d
(92)
Also note from Theorem 5, (91) and (21) that
Uw,hybrid =
D2max
4d
(93)
Now, we obtain the expression of Uc,hybrid. From Theorem 4 and (91) we obtain
Uc,hybrid = (ba1 − Dmax
2d
)Dmax/2 (94)
The result readily follows from (91)-(94).
D. Proofs of Results in Section VII
We provide the outlines of the proofs of Corollaries 7,8, 9 and 10.
Proof of Corollary 7 First we compare the demand of end-users in different models when dba1 ≤ Dmax/3 (Step 1).
Subsequently, we compare the demand of end-users in different models when 2Dmax ≤ dba1 > Dmax/3 (Step 2) and
5Dmax > dba1 > 2Dmax (Step 3). Finally, we consider the case when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax (Step 4). This will complete the proof.
Step 1: When dba1 ≤ Dmax/3, then from Corollaries 1 and 5, Dpush = Dhybrid. Also from Corollary 3 Dpull > Dpush.
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Step 2:When 2Dmax ≤ dba1 > Dmax/3, then from Corollaries 1 and 5 Dpush = Dhybrid. But Dpull remains constant at
Dmax/3. Thus,
Dhybrid = Dpush > Dpull if2Dmax ≤ dba1 > Dmax
Dhybrid = Dpush = Dpull ifdba1 = Dmax
Dhybrid = Dpush < Dpull ifDmax/3 < dba1 < Dmax
Step 3:When 5Dmax > dba1 > 2Dmax, then Dpush > Dhybrid from Corollaries 1 and 6. Also note from Corollary 4
Dpush > Dpull and Dhybrid > Dpull.
Step 4:When dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, then Dpush = Dmax by Corollary 2 which is higher than Dhybrid (Corollary 6) and Dpull
(Corollary 4). Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 8 We first compare the payoff of the IoTSP in the push and pull models (Step 1). Towards this end we
first show that when dba1 ≤ Dmax/3, then UI,push < UI,pull using Corollaries 1 and 3 (Step 1a). Subsequently, we show
that that UI,push − UI,pull is strictly decreasing when Dmax/3 ≤ dba1 < 5Dmax using Corollaries 4 and 1. Since when
dba1 = Dmax/3, UI,pull > UI,push, thus, it readily follows that UI,push < UI,pull when dba1 < 5Dmax (Step 1b). Finally,
we show that even when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, then UI,push < UI,pull using Corollaries 4 and 2 (Step 2). Finally, we show that
UI,hybrid = UI,push when dba1 ≤ 2Dmax, however, UI,push > UI,hybrid when dba1 > 2Dmax (Step 3). This will complete
the proof. The detailed proof is given below.
Step 1: We first compare between UI,push and UI,pull.
Step 1a: dba1 ≤ Dmax/3
Comparing Corollaries 1, and 3 we obtain UI,push < UI,pull in this case.
Step 1b: Dmax/3 < dba1 ≤ 5Dmax
From Corollaries 1 and 4 the difference between UI,push and UI,pull is
d(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2 − ba1Dmax/3
It is easy to verify that the above expression is strictly decreasing in ba1 for dba1 < 5Dmax. But when dba1 = Dmax/3, the
above expression is negative. Thus, UI,push < UI,pull for 5Dmax > dba1 > Dmax/3.
Step 1c: dba1 ≥ 5Dmax.
Note from Corollary 2 that when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, then UI,push = D2max/d, but from Corollary 4 UI,pull is ba1Dmax/3
which is strictly higher compared to D2max/d for dba1 ≥ 5Dmax.
Thus, UI,push < UI,pull for all sets of parameters.
Step 2: Now, we compare the payoffs of the IoTSP in the push and hybrid models.
When 2Dmax > dba1, then from Corollaries 1 and 5 we obtain UI,push = UI,hybrid.
When dba1 > 2Dmax UI,push >
D2max
4d
(from Corollaries 6 and 1, 2), thus, UI,push > UI,hybrid.
Since UI,hybrid never exceeds UI,push and UI,push < UI,pull. Thus, UI,hybrid < UI,pull. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 9 First we compare the payoffs of the WSP in the push and pull models (Step 1). Towards this end,
we show that when dba1 ≤ Dmax/3, Uw,pull > Uw,push from Corollaries 1 and ??(Step 1.a). However, we show that
Uw,push − Uw,pull increases with ba1 Dmax/(3d) < dba1 < 5Dmax. Uw,push < Uw,pull when dba1 < 0.414Dmax. However,
Uw,push exceeds Uw,pull when dba1 > 0.414Dmax (Step 1.b). Finally, we show that even the worst case payoff of the WSP
U˜w,push is higher than Uw,pull when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax (Step 1.c.). Thus, Uw,push < Uw,pull when dba1 < 0.414Dmax and
Uw,pull < Uw,push when dba1 > 0.414Dmax.
Proceeding as similar as above Subsequently, we compare the payoffs of the WSP in the push and hybrid models (Step 2)
and the pull and hybrid models (Step 3).
Step 1: We first compare between Uw,push and Uw,pull.
Step 1.a.:dba1 ≤ Dmax/3:
From Corollaries 1 and 3 it is easy to discern that Uw,push < Uw,pull when dba1 ≤ Dmax/3.
Step 1.b.: 5Dmax > dba1 > Dmax/3:
Note from Corollaries 1 and 4 that when 5Dmax > dba1 > Dmax/3 the difference between WSP’s payoff in the push
model and that of in the pull model is
2d
(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2
− D
2
max
9d
The above expression monotonically increases with ba1. The two payoffs are equal when ba1 = 6(
Dmax√
18d
− Dmax
6d
) =
0.414Dmax/d, after that WSP’s payoff is higher in the push model compared to the pull model.
Step 1.c.:dba1 > 5Dmax:
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On the other hand note from Corollary 2 that the worst case WSP’s payoff in the push model is 2D2max/d when dba1 ≥
5Dmax which is strictly higher compared to D2max/9d which is the payoff obtained by WSP in the pull model when dba1 ≥
5Dmax (by Corollary 4).
Thus, WSP’s payoff is higher in the pull model when dba1 < 0.414Dmax and higher in the push model when dba1 >
0.414Dmax. Payoffs of WSP in the push model and in the pull model are equal when dba1 = 0.414Dmax.
Step 2: Now, we compare the payoffs in the push and hybrid models.
From Corollaries 1 and 5 it is easy to discern that Uw,push > Uw,hybrid when dba1 < 2Dmax.
Also note from Corollary 1 and 6 that Uw,push > Uw,hybrid when 5Dmax > dba1 ≥ 2Dmax.
When dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, then U˜w,push (the worst case payoff) is strictly higher compared to the payoff in the hybrid model
(Corollary 6). Thus, Uw,push > Uw,hybrid for all sets of parameters.
Step 3: Now, we compare Uw,pull and Uw,hybrid.
Step 3a: dba1 ≤ Dmax/3:
From Corollaries 3 and 5 Uw,pull > Uw,hybrid when dba1 ≤ Dmax/3.
Step 3b: 2Dmax > dba1 > Dmax/3:
Note from Corollaries 5 and 4 that when 2Dmax > dba1 > Dmax/3 the difference between WSP’s payoff in the hybrid
model and that of in the pull model is
d
(
Dmax
6d
+
ba1
6
)2
− D
2
max
9d
The above expression monotonically increases with ba1. The two payoffs are equal when ba1 = Dmax/d, after that WSP’s
payoff is higher in the hybrid model compared to the pull model.
Step 3c: dba1 ≥ 2Dmax:
When dba1 ≥ 2Dmax, then by Corollaries 6 and 4 Uw,hybrid > Uw,pull. Thus, when dba1 < Dmax, Uw,pull > Uw,hybrid.
When dba1 > Dmax, Uw,pull < Uw,hybrid. When dba1 = Dmax, Uw,hybrid = Uw,pull.
Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 10: The comparison of the payoffs of CSP in the push model and pull model is exactly the same as for
the WSP. Thus, we omit it here. We thus, start with comparing the payoffs of the CSP in the push and hybrid model (Step
1). We first show that Uc,hybrid < Uc,push when dba1 < 5Dmax (Step 1a). When dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, the payoff of the CSP
in the push model is not unique since the equilibrium is not unique (by Theorem 1). We show that the worst case payoff of
the CSP is strictly less than Uc,hybrid (Step 1b). However, the best possible payoff of the CSP is higher than Uc,hybrid when
dba1 > 5.5Dmax (Step 1c). Finally, we compare the payoffs of the CSP in the hybrid and pull models and we show that
Uc,hybrid > Uc,pull for all values of the parameters (Step 2).
Step 1:We compare the payoff of CSP in the push model and the hybrid model.
Step 1a: dba1 < 5Dmax
From Corollaries 1 and 5 we obtain Uc,hybrid > Uc,push for dba1 < 2Dmax.
On then other hand when 5Dmax > dba1 ≥ 2Dmax, then the difference between Uc,push (Corollary 1) and Uc,hybrid
(Corollary 6) is
2d(
Dmax
6d
+ ba1/6)
2 − (ba1 − Dmax
2d
)Dmax/2 (95)
The above expression is strictly decreasing in ba1 for ba1 < 3.5Dmax and strictly increasing in ba1 for ba1 > 3.5Dmax.
It attains the minimum value at ba1 = 3.5Dmax. Note that both at dba1 = 2Dmax and dba1 = 5Dmax, the expression is
negative. Thus, Uc,hybrid > Uc,push when 5Dmax > dba1 ≥ 2Dmax.
Step 1b: We now compare the worst possible payoff of the CSP (U˜c,push) in the push model and the payoff of the CSP in
the hybrid model when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax.
When dba1 ≥ 5Dmax, the worst case payoff of CSP U˜c,push in the push model is 2D2max/d (see Corollary 2). It is easy
discern from Corollary 6 that Uc,hybrid > U˜c,push when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax.
Step 1c: We now compare the best possible payoff of the CSP in the push model (Uc,best,push) and the payoff of the CSP
in the hybrid model when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax.
The best possible payoff of the CSP in the push model is (ba1 − 3Dmax/d)Dmax when dba1 ≥ 5Dmax(see Corollary 2).
Now, Uc,best,push (the best possible payoff of the CSP in the push model) −Uc,hybrid when dba1 > 5Dmax is
(ba1 − 3Dmax/d)Dmax − (ba1 −Dmax/2d)Dmax/2 (96)
The above expression is strictly positive when dba1 > 5.5Dmax, when dba1 < 5.5Dmax it is negative. Thus, Uc,best,push >
Uc,hybrid when dba1 > 5.5Dmax and Uc,hybrid > Uc,best,push when dba1 < 5.5Dmax, Uc,hybrid = Uc,best,push when dba1 =
5.5Dmax.
Step 2: Now, we compare the payoffs in the hybrid model and the pull model.
Note from Corollaries 3 and 5 when dba1 ≤ Dmax/3, then Uc,hybrid > Uc,pull.
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It is also easy to discern from Corollaries 5 and 4 that when 2Dmax > dba1 > Dmax/3, then the payoff of CSP in the hybrid
model is higher compared to the payoff of CSP in the pull model, since 3d(
Dmax
6d
+ba1/6)
2 >
D2max
9d
when dba1 > Dmax/3.
When dba1 ≥ 2Dmax, then Uc,hybrid (Corollary 6) is (ba1 −Dmax/2d)Dmax/2 which strictly higher than D2max/(9d) for
dba1 ≥ 2Dmax/d.
Thus, Uc,hybrid > Uc,pull for any value of dba1. Hence, the result follows.
